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1  I N T R O D U C T I O N :  T H E  P R O B L E M  O F  T H E O R Y  
A N D  P R A C T I C E  
Latour attacks the grand divides within our conceptualisation of the world. 
He attacks the divide between nature and society (Latour, 1987) and the divide 
between pre-scientific and scientific cultures (Latour, 1988a). This paper 
concerns another grand divide, this time within the field of management and 
organisations (and probably every other field): The divide between theory and 
practice. Schön (1983) gives an account of the origins of this divide. Somehow 
it is an implicit underlying assumption in modern or positivist sciences that 
theories should be able to help create a better practice – and ultimately a better 
world. But this linear relationship is often questioned, and the critiques appear in 
a variety of disguises. 
First, it is common that “lay” people question the relevance of theory as 
exemplified in the saying: “Theory is one thing, but practice is something 
completely different”. Another version of the same theme comes from a 
manager of an SME who once stated: “To me, theories are something that 
doesn’t work in practice.” 
Second, doing research in close relationship with practitioners also turns 
the question of the relationship between theory and practice into a central issue. 
I currently work as a part of a project, which aims at creating management 
concepts and consulting methods specially suited to the reality of small and 
medium sized enterprises. The project has three types of participants: Theorists, 
Consultants and 27 SME’s. Within this context the question is crucial, because 
the participants somehow represent every aspect of the question. 
This paper discusses reasons for why it is difficult to bridge between the 
two worlds and looks for a world beneath this bridge through reformulating the 
relationship between theory and practice. The paper is structured into three main 
sections.  
Section 2 “Theory and Practice in a Parallel-world Perspective” discusses 
two possible reasons for the problems moving between theory and practice – one 
reason based on complexity and chaos theory, and another based on a 
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postmodern epistemology. Second, the section briefly reviews some bridges 
between the worlds of theory and practice. 
Section 3 “Looking for a World Beneath the Bridge” discusses the world 
beneath on a background coloured by actor-network theory (ANT). First, it asks 
for what is called paradigmatic symmetry between theorising and practicing as a 
first step in building a world beneath the bridge between theory and practice. 
Paradigmatic symmetry says that it should be possible to found theorising and 
practicing and the same set of fundamental beliefs. In addition, the section starts 
building this “world beneath” through looking for similarities between the act of 
theorising and the act of entrepreneuring in an attempt to see these different 
processes on a common background of actor-network theory. 
A central theme in the concluding section is to suggest a distinction 
between re-search and re-think. It is argued that while modernist theorising 
emphasises re-search and postmodern theorising emphasises re-think, the 
perspective of this paper can make sense to both re-search and re-think. 
Furthermore, “multiple applicability” is suggested as a criterion to evaluate the 
quality of re-thinking. 
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2  T H E O R Y  A N D  P R A C T I C E  I N  A  P A R A L L E L -
W O R L D  P E R S P E C T I V E  
Latour (e.g. 1993; 1999) argues that both modernism and postmodernism 
are based on an idea of two separated worlds. He focuses on the separation 
between nature and society. But the separations take on different clothing in 
different fields, e.g. technology-culture, environment-organisation, object-
subject. This section briefly looks into both modern and postmodern reasons for 
the problems of bridging between theories and practice. Figure 1 illustrates the 
theme of this section: Two parallel worlds. A chasm and attempts to bridge: 
World of 
Theory 
World of 
Practice 
Figure 1: Two parallel worlds, a chasm and a bridge 
The modern reasons are based on theories of complexity and chaos, and 
the postmodern reasons are based on the crisis of representation. Moreover, both 
modern and postmodern attempts to cross the chasm between theory and 
practice are briefly discussed. Through discussing modern and postmodern 
reasons for the problems of bridging, I believe to have touched upon two 
primary undercurrents of mainstream organisational and management theorising. 
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2.1 MODERN AND POSTMODERN REASONS FOR THE PROBLEMS 
2.1.1 Modern Reasons for Difficulties of Bridging: Chaos and Complexity 
A first question to ask is: What does the world of organisations and 
management look like: “Try a little experiment” Mason & Mitroff (1998) 
challenge us and continue: 
Make a short list of the major problems or issues facing policymakers in the world today. Now 
take your list and arrange it as a matrix like the one in [The figure below]. For each element in the 
matrix ask yourself the following question: Is the solution to one problem (the row problem) in 
any way related to the solution of the other problem (the column problem)? If the answer is yes, 
place a check mark at the point where the row and column intersect; otherwise leave it blank. 
(Mason & Mitroff, 1998, p. 41) 
 
 Peace      
Peace  Energy     
Energy   Starvation    
Starvation    Civil rights   
Civil rights     Population  
Population      Balance 
of 
Paymen
t 
Balance of 
Payment 
      
Figure 2: Problem interaction matrix 
Source: (Mason & Mitroff, 1998, p. 41) 
In this way Mason & Mitroff try to convince us that an enormous 
complexity arises from the fact that many real life problems cannot be isolated 
from each other. Ackoff (1979) makes a corresponding point as he asserts that:  
“Managers are not confronted with problems that are independent of each other, but with dynamic 
situations that consist of complex systems of changing problems that interact with each other. I 
call such situations messes. Problems are abstractions extracted from messes by analysis; they are 
to messes as atoms are to tables and chairs. .. Because messes are systems of problems, the sum of 
the optimal solution to each component problem taken separately is not an optimal solution to the 
mess” (Ackoff, 1979, p. 99-100) 
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In this way practical management problems are not clear-cut. They are 
often messy and intermingled, which makes it difficult to apply theoretical 
solutions developed to solve well-defined and isolated problems.  
Chaos theory is another related line of theory that may help explain the gab 
between theory and practice. It has entered the field of management, 
organisation (se e.g. Parker & Stacey, 1994; Stacey, 1998; Thiétart & Forgues, 
1995) and entrepreneurship, where Bygrave argues, that it provides a good 
metaphor for sharpening our philosophy and methodology (Bygrave, 1989). 
These theorists emphasise that organisational reality has chaotic properties. This 
line of thinking emphasises that organisations are an intricate mixture of order 
and disorder, regularity and irregularity (Parker & Stacey, 1994), where a small 
change in one variable has unpredictable large impact on the systems’ evolution, 
which make predictions impossible (Thiétart & Forgues, 1995). This is often 
referred to as the so called “butterfly effect”, i.e. the idea that a flab of a 
butterfly’s wing can create a storm a few months later. Based on these ideas 
Thiétart & Forgues (1995, p. 27) argue that similar actions taken by 
organisations in a state of chaos will never lead to the same result. In addition, 
when in a chaotic state, two identical actions taken by the same organisation 
always lead to two different results and the same action taken by two 
organisations never lead to the same result. 
 In the fields where the above arguments are reasonable, at least as a 
metaphor, it is understandable, that it is possible to get the idea, that theory is 
something that doesn’t work in practice. This is true; especially if theories are 
built on assumptions akin to ceteris paribus, which leads to the next question. 
The second question to ask is: What are the consequences of approaching 
this messy reality as done by researchers/scientists in search for verifiable and 
reliable answers to their questions? Schön (1983; 1995) talks about a dilemma of 
“rigor or relevance”: 
“In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground where practitioners 
can make effective use of research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy lowland 
where situations are confusing “messes” incapable of technical solution. The difficulty is that the 
problems of the high ground, however great their technical interest, are often relatively 
unimportant to clients or to the larger society, while in the swamp are the problems of greatest 
human concern.” (Schön, 1983, s. 42) 
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On the high hard ground, it is possible to emphasise rigorous research 
procedures. But if these preferences for rigour are maintained in the “swampy 
lowland”, it can lead to results that are irrelevant for practitioners. Van de Ven 
describes the possible consequences of adhering to rigour as the ultimate 
criterion for research in the following way:  
If scientists cannot answer their initial questions, they can modify or simplify them until they show 
promise of being answerable. If this process repeats itself, as is customary, the research questions 
and answers become increasingly trivial contributions to science, and even more irrelevant to 
practice. (Van de Ven, 2000, p. 396-397) 
If rigour has to be maintained as primary criterion for judging the quality 
of an “academic answer”, the costs might be that the research questions have to 
be modified until they are answerable. Somehow it seems to be working the 
wrong way around, if a set of procedures for evaluating an answer should play 
any role in defining a question.  
Formulated a little more provoking modernist research risk the faith of 
“Crossword Research”: The problem and the boundaries are well-defined; a 
solution demands formal logic and extreme consistency. When a solution is 
found it is obvious to everyone, that this is the solution. It is obvious if some 
parts of the problem have not been solved. In this way it is easy for successors to 
see where they can make a contribution.  
In sum, the solution is consistent and indisputable. But … and there is a 
but … when ones eyes are turned away from the crossword and towards life as it 
is lived, i.e. practice, the solution of the crossword has not any relevance at all… 
It is beautiful and consistent within its own boundaries, but seen in relation to 
live as it is lived, crosswords serve the role of amusement. And if crosswords 
make a contribution outside the defined boundaries, it is in an indirect way. 
Proponents of crosswords claim that they are exercises to the brain… 
2.1.2 Postmodern Reasons: How Can Words ever Mirror Reality? 
Postmodernism began the day when someone started to grabble with the 
relationship between object and representations of the object – e.g. the 
relationship between language (representation) and the world (object) that 
language is often presumed to describe. Within a modernist perspective, this 
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relationship is perceived as unproblematic in the way, that language – to use 
Rorty’s expression – mirrors an underlying reality. Language is a tool for 
transferring meaning. Within this perspective theories – which usually are 
transferred via language – can be evaluated according to the degree of 
correspondence to this underlying reality. Or in other words, how well the 
theorist has polished his mirror (Gergen & Thatchenkery, 1996)!  
Woolgar (1988, pp. 32-33) questions this idea of representation through a 
discussion of three methodological horrors. 
The first horror is that it is impossible to establish a stable relationship 
between representation and the underlying reality, which is represented. The 
reality is never fixed and always in a state of movement – in a state of becoming 
(Chia, 1995; Steyaert, 1997). A description of a culture cannot have a stable 
relationship to the culture because the culture is always in process. Accounting 
numbers are often used as part of the basis for evaluating a company’s future 
potential – but it cannot do it faithfully because the future potential is always 
continually changing due to upcoming circumstances.  
The second horror is, that the task of representing a reality is in principle 
endless. It will always be possible to ask for further clarifications, it will always 
be possible to describe a phenomenon in closer details or from other 
perspectives. A description of a culture can never be so comprehensive that it 
describes every aspect of an underlying culture and how “it” will react in 
different situations. Accounting numbers – not even combined with the 
incredible amount of different types of accounting like knowledge accounting, 
ethical accounting, growth accounting, and ecological accounting can give a 
total picture of a company’s future potential. It is always possible to ask for 
further clarifications. 
The third horror is that the relationship between representation and object 
is dialectic – and not as traditionally assumed unidirectional from object to 
representation. The meaning an observer attributes to a representation changes if 
he gets other experiences with the represented. Conversely, the representation 
can influence the object. This could for example be a culture, which changes 
because it is described or because of a description of it. 
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Gergen points towards the problem of representation in a little more poetic 
way, when he asks: “In what way can words be matched against visual images, 
sounds and the like?” (Gergen, 1992, p. 210) 
Maybe this can help explain why theory is something that doesn’t work in 
practice: Not even good theories are accurate mirrors of reality, which can help 
practitioners create a better world. For at least to reasons. First, theories are not 
simplifying mirrors of reality but language constructions in the form of words, 
tables, graphs, drawings, etc. And second, relativism tells us, that there is such 
thing as a reality at all, and therefore, no universal better world to create. 
Some social constructivists point towards studying how people understand 
and make sense of their subjective realities, and they point towards another way 
to acquire relevance: 
The goal of research into the production of meaning is to produce clear and accurate descriptions 
of the structures and forms of the various meaning systems. This type of outcome does not provide 
information for the prediction and control of behaviour; instead, it provides a kind of knowledge 
that individuals and groups can use to increase the power and control they have over their own 
actions. (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 10) 
In this quotation Polkinghorne argues that research into meaning systems 
gains the relevance from making the individuals or groups studied aware of the 
way the meaning systems influence their behaviour. Thereby, he argues, they 
will be put in a position to question their own meaning systems and thereby 
become better to control their own actions. A similar point is made by 
Damgaard et al. arguing that managerial implications from research guided by a 
humanistic inquiry method: “will be on a procedural level rather than on a level 
where specific instructions are given, though the researcher’s role will be to 
guide a learning process as opposed to offering managerial solutions” 
(Damgaard et al., 2000, p. 153). A little earlier they state that “The aim is, of 
course, action but action reached by the individuals themselves as a consequence 
of changed understandings” (Damgaard et al., 2000, p. 153). 
But – if I again may bring up a minor provocation – isn’t this focus on 
acquiring a sense of relevance through focusing at the benefits of the subjects 
studied more a kind of pedagogy or therapy than it is research of broader 
interest? Isn’t the risk that it is only by coincidence, if “knowledge” acquired in 
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this way is “usable” to other practitioners than those involved in the study, and it 
thereby becomes another version of crossword science as described above? 
The modernist version of crossword science emphasised that the initial 
questions are modified and boundaries are set until the questions show promise 
of being answerable. Here a sense of relevance is acquired, not through 
modifying the initial question, but through limiting the scope of the research to 
the individuals or groups studied, while it is relatively silent when it comes to 
what it means to other individuals or groups outside the study. 
2.2 TRADITIONAL WAYS OF BRIDGING 
One way to go is to refuse the need for immediate relevance of a theory. It 
may not be immediately relevant to practitioners, but should be considered as a 
stepping-stone on a way to some future benefits, which we cannot imagine right 
know. Research should be a place for playing with ideas and illusions that 
someone someday may be able to link to something else in a creative way and 
turn it into something useful. I acknowledge such arguments, but here I focus on 
more immediate relations between theory and practice. 
2.2.1 A Modern Bridge: Answers to the Challenge of Chaos and Complexity 
From a modernist position it was argued, that the chaos and complexity of 
practice could be possible reasons why it is difficult to bridge theory and 
practice. Based on an idea of chaos, Stacey (1998, pp. 679-682) recommends 
practitioners to e.g. provoke multiple cultures, present ambiguous challenges 
instead of clear long-term objectives or visions or create resource slack. 
Everything with the idea, that in a complex and changing world you cannot rely 
on stable types of knowledge. 
While Stacy points towards the practitioner and how he can make use of 
theories of chaos, Argyris (1996) points towards the types of theories produced. 
According to Argyris, traditional views of theory are that theory should describe 
and explain. This is often fulfilled through observations – without intervention – 
or controlled experiments. But he points out that for management, creation is 
important, and theories, which aim at describing and explaining, often fail to 
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inform practitioners how to create. To exemplify, he points to the generalisation, 
that mild levels of frustration lead to creativity, while high levels of frustration 
leads to regression. This generalisation can help explain. But it is difficult to use 
in the service of creation, because how do you measure and manage the level of 
frustration? And as Argyris – in a very “Argyrisian” way – points out: The 
manager has to cover what he is doing, and cover that something is covered! 
Instead he asks for Actionable Knowledge, which is knowledge that not 
just produces generalisation with high external validity (relevance), but also 
inform the practitioner how to create or produce the conditions where the 
generalisations hold true. Non-actionable knowledge consists of generalisations 
like if A (e.g. mild levels of frustration) then B (creativity). But this knowledge 
is developed within settings that are controlled in ways that are not possible or at 
least unethical to create in managerial practice. Actionable knowledge, by 
contrast, focus on creating knowledge that says if you do A then B will happen. 
2.2.2 A Postmodern Bridge: Answers to the Challenge of Representation 
If we start questioning the possibility of representation, it can lead to what 
Weick, citing Varela, summarises in a “Cartesian Anxiety”. 
”Cartesian anxiety is ”best put as a dilemma: either we have a fixed and stable foundation for 
knowledge, a point where knowledge starts, is grounded, and rests, or we cannot escape some sort 
of darkness, chaos, and confusion. Either there is an absolute ground or foundation or everything 
falls apart” (Varela et al., 1991, p. 140)” (Weick, 1995, p. 37)  
But Gergen summarises the problem in the following way, and at the same 
time he proposes a way to move on: 
, if we do not base theories on conceptions of rationality, motivation, emotion and the like, where 
do we turn? Of equal importance, how can we take the process of theory construction seriously? If 
we cannot offer truth, objective accounts removed from our own valuational biases, then on what 
grounds can any new formulations be justified? If there are no foundations for theoretical 
formulations, and these are only linguistic constructions, then why play the fool – whose serious 
words turn to mere posturing in the hands of the deconstructionist critic? 
.. 
Yet, we are moved to silence only if persuaded by the modernist presumption that objective truth 
is the only game in town. If the function of theories is not derived from their truth value, but from 
their pragmatic implications, then the theoretical voice is restored to significance. And the 
potential of theoretical work is far greater than that assigned to it under modernist conditions. 
(Gergen, 1992, s. 217) 
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To postmodern writers, theorists “are engaging in ‘story-telling’ more than 
in ‘truth-telling’” (Chia, 1996, p. 51) The theories produced cannot mirror a 
reality out there independent of the different tools used to make the 
representations. Instead theorising plays an active part in construction of what is 
considered to be real within a community. 
Therefore, Gergen turns towards pragmatic consequences of theories rather 
than their correspondence with a reality in distinguishing good from bad 
theorising. Good theories are theories that enable new types or directions of 
understanding or action. The BCG-matrix (Hedley, 1998) is an excellent 
example. This matrix recommends corporate managers to consider their 
corporation as a collection of strategic business units (SBU). These SBUs can 
then be evaluated in a matrix with relative market share at the first dimension 
and market attractiveness at the other. This leads to four possible positions for 
each SBU – positions with distinct recommended actions: Dog, Question Marks, 
Stars or Cash Cows.  
But no corporate managers sincerely believe that some SBUs literally are 
cows while others are stars, dogs, or question marks. I don’t know how this 
matrix was developed, but I do not think it was developed through carefully 
designed experiments aiming at falsifying hypothesis. However, I feel pretty 
sure that this matrix has had tremendous pragmatic implications. It has made 
managers see their businesses in a different light and has pointed toward 
alternative lines of action, which the managers themselves could translate into 
concrete actions in specific situations. 
Some may argue that a recommendation to “maintain the position in the 
cash cows” (Hedley, 1998, p. 430) is rather abstract and vague. It does not point 
towards concrete actions. How do you “maintain the position” – what actions 
does it imply? To this challenge Astley & Zammuto (1992, p. 446) argue that 
linguistic ambiguity enhances the conceptual appeal of a theory and increases 
the range of practical situations to which they can shed new light and 
understanding. 
This point separate this way of bridging or acquiring practical relevance 
from the social constructivist version of crossword science as discussed in 
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section 2.1.2. Instead of focusing on the benefits accrued by the individuals or 
groups participating in the research, the argument here is that linguistic 
ambiguity increases the range of practical situations to which theories can be 
seen as relevant. 
In short, some theorists who doubt the possibility of mirroring reality 
through theories turn towards pragmatic consequences of theories. They turn 
towards conceptualising theorising as an act of creation rather than discovering. 
Theories are good when they enable new types of actions. In this way some 
postmodernists take the challenge of the relationship between theories and 
practice very seriously. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
The perspectives presented above, can be summarised in the following 
figure, showing both a modern and a postmodern bridge, with two lanes seen 
 
World of 
Theory 
World 
of 
Practice Images created and legitimized 
through theorizing creates practice
Impossible to picture or represent 
Taken to be unproblematic if 
pictures are good enough 
Simplify through 
uncovering/picturing underlying 
mechanisms World of 
Theory 
 
World of 
Practice 
Modern Bridge 
Postmodern 
Bridge 
from above: 
Figure 3: Modern and Postmodern bridges between theory and practice 
The lane going from practice to theory on the modernist bridge tells that 
ideally theories are pictures of underlying mechanisms in practice. These 
pictures are helped into existence by rigorous scientific methods. The lane from 
theory to practice is assumed to be without hindrances provided that the pictures 
are sufficiently accurate. Under modernist assumptions the world of practice is 
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“strongest” while the world of theories passively try to assure correspondence. 
Looking at the postmodern bridge, it is impossible to cross the lane from 
practice to theory. On the other hand the world of theory influences the way 
practice is performed through delivering and legitimising ways to “see” and 
interp
ulate 
the relationship between theory and practice. 
ret and thereby points towards ways of acting. 
But up to this point it is only discussed why it is difficult to bridge, and 
how attempts are made in order to do it. In the following I will walk to the 
middle of these unstable maybe even mirage-like bridges and lean over the edge 
to look beneath them. Based on actor-network theory, I will try to reform
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3  L O O K I N G  F O R  A  W O R L D  B E N E A T H  T H E  
B R I D G E  
A range of authors suggest that what can equally be termed the sociology 
of translation (e.g. Callon, 1986b; Latour, 1987) or actor-network theory (ANT) 
(e.g. Latour, 1996; Law, 1992, 1999) is a line of thinking, which can aid 
theorising moving beyond the modernism-postmodernism discussion (Brown, 
1992; Calas & Smircich, 1999; Lee & Hassard, 1999)1. Therefore, this section 
discusses the relationship between theory and practice on a background coloured 
by ANT. 
Latour (1989) argues that rationalists and social relativists are playing the 
same game, but in a mirror. In the fight against each other, both rationalists and 
relativists tend to purify their own arguments in ways that make them drift more 
and more apart from each other. But are the more and more purified paradigms 
they develop in this mirror-game suitable for informing practical living?  
If it is because I am rooted in business studies, I do not know, but I feel 
that the paradigms or foundations guiding research should also be able to inform 
practical life. For business studies practical life is often considered to be 
management. Therefore, I am asking for symmetry between foundations for 
researching and foundations for living! In other words, I am asking for 
paradigmatic symmetry between theorising and practicing. The challenge is for 
theorists to reflect upon the question: (How) can a practitioner benefit from the 
procedures and assumptions guiding my research? 
In the following, ANT is discussed as a line of thinking that can meet this 
challenge of paradigmatic symmetry between theorising and practicing. It is 
suggested that it can be done through two related ideas: First, the concept of 
quasi-object merges the two parallel worlds of practice and theory into one. 
                                          
1 Further, some authors (Chia, 1995; Gergen, 1992) suggest actor-network ideas as a way to engage in 
postmodern organizational analyses. But as Latour explicitly rejects postmodernism (Latour, 1993, 1999), they 
are not counted as pointing towards ANT as a way to move on from postmodernism. Rather, they see ANT as a 
way to contribute to postmodernism, and in this way they are still allies to the claim that ANT is a way to move 
on. 
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Second, a new conceptualisation of theory and practice is created based on an 
idea of distance. Moreover, it is “tested” if these ideas meet the challenge of 
paradigmatic symmetry through discussing both theorising and entrepreneuring 
– as an example of practicing – through the same lenses to see if it makes sense. 
In re-conceptualising the relationship between theory and practice, some of 
the ideas presented under the modernist and postmodernist perspectives are 
maintained in asserting that: Organisational realities consist of unfolding events 
with (often) chaotic properties and representations of events play an active part 
in extraction and construction of problems and truths. 
3.1 MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE: QUASI-OBJECTS 
ANT claims that realities are constructed within networks of relations. 
ANT pays large attention towards treating humans and non-humans equally at 
the outset of analysis, and treating relations among both humans and non-
humans as parts of the networks. Instead of a world of two as described above, 
Latour (1993) argues, our world is and is populated by quasi-objects. Quasi-
objects are constructed simultaneously by both sides of the dualities: Quasi-
objects are simultaneously society and nature, theory and practice. Nothing is 
either or. Is a computer society or nature? Theory or practice? Is an organisation, 
with all its people, machines and other heterogeneous materials society or 
nature? Theory or practice? Is a person society or nature? Theory or practice? 
No, they are all quasi-objects. They are simultaneously society and nature, 
theory and practice. 
Returning to the idea of theory as storytelling, it is possible to get the 
impression that they are just stories instead of representations of reality, and 
therefore harmless. But Woolgar (1988) emphasises, that an act of representing 
is an act of construction. Through representations realities are constructed rather 
than mirrored. This again can lead critics to argue, with irony in their voices, 
that a community socially can construct everything – or turned upside-down – 
that it is nonsense to postulate that the seas or the mountains are socially 
constructed through language. To answer this kind of critics Knorr-Cetina 
argues for epistemic relativism, which: 
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“.. is not committed to the idea that there is no material world, or that all knowledge claims are 
equally good or bad, or to the idea that meter readings can be made to our liking. It is only 
committed to the idea that what we make of physical resistances and of meter signals is itself 
grounded in human assumptions and selections which appear to be specific to a particular 
historical place and time.”(Knorr-Cetina, 1982, p. 320-321) 
This position accepts the existence of a material world, which can “talk 
back” to the social, through resistance or objection. So the racing cyclists in 
Tour de France cannot talk or simply imagine the mountains away. The 
mountains will resist when they meet them. But if this resistance is torture or an 
opportunity to attack is not determined solely by the mountains. It is determined 
in the relation between the individual cyclists, his position in the race, his level 
of fatigue, actions by others, slope of the mountain, etc.  
In this way, the mountains in Tour de France are not just nature and not 
just culture. But they are quasi-objects – they are simultaneously nature and 
culture. If the culture side is removed they become irrelevant - if there was no 
society no one would bracket a piece of nature and call it a mountain. If the 
nature side is removed the mountains become an instance of “collective 
solipsism”2. Quasi-objects are simultaneous theory and practice, they are 
simultaneously event (practice) and concept (theory). 
With reference to Derrida, Chia discusses a distinction between nothing 
and no-thing. There is not “nothing” outside language (representation) but there 
is “no-thing” (Chia, 1996). Meaning, content, boundaries, etc, do not exist 
within objects (no-things), but are determined in relations. No-things become 
things with meaning, boundaries etc, when they are performing within networks 
of relations. And they are only things in relation to this network. Thereby, this 
                                          
2 The term coined here, ”collective solipsism”, seems like an oxymoron. Burrell and Morgan state: 
”Solipsism represents the most extreme form of subjective idealism, in that it denies that the world has any 
distinct independent reality. For the solipsist, the world is the creation of his mind. Ontologically, it has no 
existence beyond the sensations which he perceives in his mind and body.” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 238-
239). In this way the term solipsism is seen as an extreme consequence of lines of thinking emphasizing 
subjectivity. The term “collective solipsism” on the other hand is meant as an extreme consequence of lines of 
thinking emphasizing language and discourse as constituting reality and individuals as mere mediums of 
collective thought styles – or in Chia´s words: “The process of inquiry is often believed to be the product of a 
dualistic relationship between the knowing subject and the object to be known. This view, however, neglects the 
significance of existing cognitive codes and consequently the style of thinking within a particular community 
which serves to shape the very possibilities of individual knowing.” (Chia, 1995, p. 582, original emphasis) 
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perspective differs from a Kantian idea of things-in-themselves as essences we 
cannot apprehend.  
Outside our apprehension there are not things-in-themselves, but simply 
no-things! Things are quasi-objects – no-things performing in heterogeneous 
relations.  
3.2 RE-CONCEPTUALISING THEORY: A MATTER OF DISTANCE 
Through the concept of quasi-objects two parallel worlds – a world of 
practice and a world of theory – have been merged into one world beneath the 
bridge: A world of quasi-objects which are simultaneously practice and theory. 
If this image is maintained there is no need for a bridge between theory and 
practice, since all life is lived beneath the bridge. But this merging of theory and 
practice is not enough to fight the common sense idea of theory as something 
different from practice. Latour’s (1988b) ideas of distance between settings and 
wishes to act upon distant settings can be seen as a basis for re-conceptualising 
theory. 
A strong explanation [theory] becomes necessary when someone wishes to act at a distance 
(Latour, 1987). If you are in the setting x’ you do not need to explain it – practice and weak 
accounts will be sufficient. If you are away from the setting and indifferent to it, you do not need 
to explain it either – practice in the new setting x will do. If you are away and simply remembering 
how it was when you were in setting x’ you still do not need powerful explanations – story-telling 
will do the job much better. You start to need a stronger explanation when you are away and still 
wish to act on the setting x’. (Latour, 1988b, p. 159) 
Therefore, instead of two parallel worlds, it is suggested to conceptualise 
theory as: What a given centre believes to be the true about and possible to 
accomplish in the periphery relative to this centre and its intentions. Theory is 
what a given centre here and now believes to be true about a not-present there 
and (w/t)hen.  
This conceptualisation of theory takes in principle a heterogeneous actor as 
basis of theorising, and not an idea of some universal truths. It defines theory as 
the beliefs held by this actor about something not-present – about something 
distant. Let us look at some examples: 
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For a researcher (centre) theory is, what he believes to be true about his 
field of study (periphery). It is what he believes, about the world outside the 
walls of the university, while he is sitting at his relatively comfortable desk. The 
scientific methods for acquiring these believes are practice to him. It is 
something present here and now while he is theorising.  
For a manager theory is what he today believes to be true about or possible 
to accomplish in the future. What he today believes to be true and possible about 
the production line – yesterday, today and tomorrow. His method for acquiring 
these believes, i.e. reading reports, meetings, dialogs, etc – is his practice. His 
practice is what he does, while his theory is what he believes. 
For an architect his practice is constructing drawings while the drawings is 
a theory of a building, which is distant in time and place from the act of 
drawing. For the carpenter this drawing is a theory of a building, but reading it 
and translating it into existence is the carpenter’s practice. 
Within this perspective theory is not something ostensively different from 
practice. But what someone at some point in time and space believes to be true 
about or believe to be possible to accomplish in another time and space. Theory 
is what a centre believes to be true about or possible to accomplish in a 
periphery distant in time and place. 
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Theory and Practice as parallel worlds with a need to bridge 
Theory:  
What a given centre believes 
to be true  about or possible to 
accomplish in periphery 
Theory as the beliefs held by a centre concerning a periphery while 
practice is the happenings in the periphery 
Practice:  
What happens in the 
periphery 
World of
Theory 
World of
Practice
Figure 4: Two conceptualisations of theory and practice 
Now an idea that there may be a world beneath the bridge between theory 
and practice is presented. Furthermore, actor-network theory is discussed as a 
line of thinking that can make sense to this world, i.e. both to theorising and 
practicing. In the following the altered relationship will discuss in a little more 
detail, through looking for similarities between theorists and practitioners. Why? 
Because they are both inhabiting the world beneath the bridge. Because they 
both are centres in their worlds and acquire knowledge from and influence what 
to them is periphery. 
3.3 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS 
From a “parallel-worlds perspective” it seems to be common sense that 
there are differences between theorists and practitioners, and to look for 
similarities is not worth the effort. A traditional view is that theorists inhabit the 
world of theories and use rational models to sort out reality. If practitioners start 
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using such cumbersome methods they will be “paralysed by analysis” and never 
reach a point of decision and ultimately action, which are perceived to be 
practitioners’ primary concern. Let the theorists sort out the world and let the 
practitioners base their actions on this knowledge! But such statements are based 
on a positivistic or modernistic conception of science.  
Faithful towards the parallel-world perspective this conception was 
criticised through two separate lines of argument. On line of argument based on 
theories of complexity and chaos, and one line based on the crises of 
representation.  
But one thing is common to all the traditional perspectives on the 
relationship between theory and practice: They all focus on the benefits to be 
accrued from the products of the theorists - i.e. the theories. Imagine if the 
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) decides to try to learn from Lego solely by 
focusing on how to use Lego bricks in their airplanes! No, instead SAS would 
look for similarities within business processes and try to learn from them.  
Traditionally theorists use practice as one ingredient among others when 
they are producing their products (theories). And practitioners ask what there is 
to learn from these products. But the perspective suggested here, based on the 
ideas of quasi-objects and theory as what a given centre believes to be true about 
something distant, makes it interesting to start learning from each other’s 
“business” processes? Will there be something for practitioners to learn from the 
way theorists construct “truths”? Will there be something for theorists to learn 
from the way practitioners create new worlds? A first step in order to look for 
similarities within “business processes” is to construct a vocabulary that can 
describe both theorising and practicing. It is to construct a vocabulary that can 
describe the two traditionally different worlds. 
 To organise the discussion focus is on those practitioners whose creations 
end up as new businesses – i.e. entrepreneurs. Therefore, the search is for 
similarities between the act of theorising and the act of entrepreneuring! The 
point of departure is to imagine both a theorist and an entrepreneur as centres 
that are dealing with a periphery (see Figure 4 page 20).  
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3.3.1 Theorising and Entrepreneuring are Acts of Creation.. 
Conceptualising both theorising and entrepreneuring as acts of creation is 
the first step in a vocabulary to look for similarities within “business processes”. 
In section 2.2.2 page 11, it was argued that theorising can be conceptualised as 
an act of creation rather than discovering. Similarly, Steyaert (1997) and Steyart 
& Bouwen (1997) encourage theorists to view entrepreneuring as an act of 
creation in a reality of becoming rather than being. Czarniawska-Joerges & 
Wolff (1991) relate the term entrepreneurship to “the making of entire new 
worlds”, while Johannisson (1999) proposes an “enactive approach” – he 
launches an entrepreneurial venture himself – in order to research into the 
emotional and volitional forces involved in trying out new realities. In this way 
both theorising and entrepreneuring is an act of creation. It is an act of creation, 
no matter whether the fact created is an innovative technical solution, a new 
model explaining the existence of organisations, a new hairdressing saloon or a 
new Microsoft.  
3.3.2 .. through Heterogeneous Engineering to Overcome Resistance .. 
But what does this act of creation involve? Both theorising and 
entrepreneuring can be conceptualised as fact making based on heterogeneous 
engineering. Heterogeneous engineering (Law, 1987) is a process “in which 
pieces from the social, the technical, the conceptual and the textual are fitted 
together, and so converted (or “translated”) into a set of equally heterogeneous 
scientific products [or new businesses, in the case of entrepreneuring]” (Law, 
1992). In short, both social and material allies have to be simultaneously aligned 
to create a fact, i.e. a scientific “discovery” or an organisation.  
We are now touching upon the re-conceptualised relation between theory 
and practice. It is a relationship of resistance and overcoming resistance between 
centre and periphery. Theory becomes practice (and thereby a true theory!) 
through overcoming resistance in the distant places the theory says something 
about in a way that the practice is aligned with the theory. Traditional modernist 
mirroring research says that this is done when the theory accurately matches the 
reality and reality thereby automatically is aligned. Postmodernists, as Gergen 
 22
  Jesper Piihl, PhD student 
  University of Southern Denmark 
cited above, turn it upside down, good theorising enables new forms of action, 
and is therefore good if periphery is aligned to it! From a management 
perspective it becomes more a matter of overcoming the resistance in the 
periphery. But let’s look at two examples. 
In a classic ANT-article, Michel Callon (1986b) illustrates how scientific 
fact creation is an accomplishment of heterogeneous engineering. His case study 
focuses on how three theorists simultaneously had to overcome resistance from 
at least four groups in order to create facts concerning how scallops could be 
cultivated in St Brieuc Bay. Resistance from scientific colleagues had to be 
overcomed – they had to be convinced that this was an important study in order 
to reach the goals of the scientific community. Resistance from the fishermen in 
the bay had to be overcome – the fishermen were greedy for fast profit, but it 
was necessary that they did not harvest the scallops while the experimenting 
went on. Resistance from the scallops had to be overcome – they did not anchor 
themselves to the seabed on request from the theorists, which was important in 
order to cultivate them. And if any of these groups could not be aligned – no 
matter if it were a “social” or a “natural” group – then no new truth would be 
created.3 The heterogeneous actors constructed and given certain meaning in the 
relation to the theorists are summarised in the following figure: 
Scallops 
Scientific 
colleagues Fishermen
Centre:  
Three theorists 
constructing truths
Periphery 
Figure 5: Periphery in relation to the theorists as center 
Let’s now consider a case of an entrepreneur: In a short – partly fictional – 
case description, Christensen (1999) tells the story of Sven Ingemann Pedersen 
                                          
3 I have a little problem with a detail in Callon’s arguments. In his eager to treat humans and non-humans 
equally, he assigns goals to each of these groups – no matter if they are human or non-human. Instead of 
assigning goals to them I would prefer assigning ”habits” – no matter if they are human or non-human. And then 
many humans have a habit of being goal directed. But this change does not influence on the main arguments and 
contributions of his article. 
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(SVIP) and his act of creation. This story is here slightly modified and retold 
through the same vocabulary as the case above in order to highlight similarities 
between theorists and entrepreneurs. SVIP was employed as a purchaser, but 
while he was on a trip to Sweden his employer went bankrupt. Sitting in his 
hotel in Sweden that evening and speculating of his situation, he suddenly 
realised that the lamp in his room was nice, but that it could be designed a lot 
simpler and thereby cheaper to manufacture. On a napkin he sketched a simpler 
design. But to transform this sketch into a business, he had to engage in 
heterogeneous engineering: SVIP had to overcome the resistance from the 
material – the lamps had a habit of falling apart. SVIP had to overcome 
resistance from customers – customers have a tendency to buy something else. 
SVIP had to overcome resistance from suppliers – unless carefully managed, 
suppliers can have a tendency to produce someone else’s orders first. SVIP 
succeeded in overcoming these resistances, and a new organisation had been 
created. But as the organisation grew other groups started to produce resistance; 
resistance that can be bracketed through the term day-to-day management tasks. 
Resistance, which, SVIP acknowledged that he had neither the competences nor 
the desire to fight. Therefore he decided to sell the company. This case can be 
illustrated as follows: 
Suppliers 
Customers
Material 
Centre:  
SVIP constructing 
business 
Periphery 
Figure 6: Periphery in relation to SVIP as centre 
3.3.3 .. with the Use of Heterogeneous Devices or Technologies ..  
Both theorists and entrepreneurs are dealing with something absent. They are 
both centres dealing with a periphery which takes its form and existence relative 
to this centre. Both theorists and entrepreneurs are dealing with phenomena that 
cannot be apprehended as they are, but only through devices of different kinds. 
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Through various devices our five senses, which can apprehend some aspects of 
the immediate, are “extended”, so to speak.  
3.3.4 .. to make the Not-Present Re-present .. 
Through questionnaires, theorists can “speak” with thousands of people at the 
same time, and he can concentrate their voices at a single point in time and 
space. Through various kinds of statistics, theorists can “observe” many 
different places at one time and from one location. Through interviews the 
theorist can “see” what the interviewee sees, saw or think. Through language 
and theories, various observations brought in to one place from events scattered 
through time and space are interpreted and ascribed meaning and thereby used 
as an element in the construction of facts like the Gross National Product or the 
balance of payment. Or “truths” like the evolution of populations of 
organisations, management conditions in SMEs, etc (See Latour, 1988a for an 
extended discussion of science as "Drawing things together")  
Equally, entrepreneurs (and other “practitioners”) extend their five senses 
through various devices. Through accounting numbers, the entrepreneur can 
“see” what is going on in foreign subsidiaries just as he can “see” what is going 
on at the local site (Robson, 1992). Trough conversations with sales agents, he 
can “see” what they saw when they visited customers or foreign markets, or 
through conversations with employees, he can “see” what is going on in his 
company. And through diverse forecasting techniques and devices, he can “see” 
what is going to happen in the future. In this way neither entrepreneurs nor 
theorists are seeing with a naked eye, but rather with an eye clothed (Latour, 
1988a) in various devices. 
3.3.5 .. and to Act at a Distance. 
Besides drawing things together, theorists and entrepreneurs use various devices 
to overcome resistance when they engage in heterogeneous engineering, when 
they try to act at a distance (For discussions of the idea of "acting at a distance", 
see Cooper, 1992; Law, 1986). They use devices to extend the abilities to 
influence beyond the abilities of the body. Law states: 
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..left to their own devices human actions and words do not spread very far at all. For me the 
conclusion is inescapable. Other materials, such as texts and technologies, surely form a crucial 
part of any ordering. (Law, 1994, p. 24, original emphasis) 
Theorists supply their questionnaires with a written instruction in order to 
guide thousands of “conversations” at the same time. Theorists use articles and 
books to extend their voices to reach far beyond the auditorium.  
Equally, entrepreneurs use devices for acting at a distance. The carpenter 
extends his arm with a hammer in order to overcome the resistance from the 
nail. Like a marketing manager extends his voice through advertising through 
mass media, an entrepreneur can extend his voice through writing down orders 
or formal procedures or by committing the resources of other people. And if 
people resist following written or formal procedures, the procedures can be 
“hardened” into the design of workstations and assembly lines. 
3.4 SUMMARY: RE-CONSEPTUALISING THE BRIDGES 
Concluding the previous section – section 2 – Figure 3 page 13, 
summarised two perspectives on bridges between theory and practice within a 
“parallel-world-perspective”. In this section an attempt was made to “imagine a 
world beneath this bridge”. First, an idea of paradigmatic symmetry was coined, 
asking for symmetry between paradigms guiding research and paradigms 
guiding practice. The idea is, that theorists should not only reflect upon how 
practitioners could benefit from the results of research; but also if practitioners 
could benefit from the assumptions guiding the research.  
Theory and practice were merged into an idea of quasi-objects. In addition, 
a difference was re-constructed through the idea of distance between centre and 
periphery, and a wish to act a distance. But then again there is a need to bridge. 
Not between two parallel worlds, but between centre and periphery. This can be 
done, it was argued, through heterogeneous devices for making the not-present 
re-present and to act at a distance. 
Based on an actor-network approach, it was proposed to conceptualise 
both theorising and entrepreneuring as: (1) An act of creation, (2) based on 
heterogeneous engineering in order to overcome resistance posed by 
heterogeneous (social and non-social) “materials”, (3) through using 
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heterogeneous devices to extend the five senses in order to be able to (4) make 
the not-present re-present and (5) to act at a distance. 
Figure 7: Re-conceptualisation of bridges 
Centre 
Periphery 
Figure 7 is intended as the “new” version of Figure 3 page 13. Instead of 
bridges between two parallel worlds, the arrows are bridges between a centre 
here and now, constructing and holding theory of practice there and then. The 
arrows illustrate the devices used by the centre in its attempts to overcome 
resistance in the periphery in order to make the not-present re-present and to act 
at a distance.  
The arrows are darkest near the centre to illustrate a relational conception 
of distance. The level of distance between a centre and a point in the periphery is 
not determined by the extent of space or time between them. Instead the level of 
distance from the centre to a point in the periphery is determined by the 
possibilities of manipulating or acting upon it. 
Concerning re-presentation, then the distance between centre and 
periphery is defined as a consequence of the difficulty of making the periphery 
re-present at the centre. Something that is impossible to re-present is at endless 
distance – no matter if it happens in the room next door or at the other side of 
the world! Concerning acting at a distance, distance is a consequence of how 
difficult it is to manipulate and therefore to overcome resistance from. Distance 
in relational terms means that things which are difficult to manipulate or act 
upon per definition are distant. 
This line of relational thinking can also be used to draw the boundaries 
between centre and periphery. Earlier, it was argued that the idea of centre and 
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periphery take the heterogeneous actor as basis of theorising. The centre is a 
heterogeneous actor. The adjective “heterogeneous” is added to actor in order to 
extend a traditional conception of an actor as a human individual. A 
heterogeneous actor is a network of relations between humans and non-humans. 
And it is considered as one actor, when the network of relations between 
heterogeneous elements is so stable, that it acts as a single unit. In this way, the 
boundary between a given centre and its periphery is drawn, where problems of 
manipulation start. Where the heterogeneous bits and pieces no longer acts 
automatically as a single unit. 
In this way, a centre can be more than one person. It can be an 
organisation. It can be a department. It can be a management team. It can be a 
worker and his machine, etc. But it is important to notice, that the centre is not 
something pre-given and stable. Rather, centres are ephemeral. A centre is 
assembled in specific relations and may suddenly dissolve, and parts of the 
centre suddenly turn into parts of the periphery, as it no more acts as a single 
unit. 
In the next section the paper will be concluded through a brief discussion 
of the consequences of this line of thinking on conceptions of theorising. 
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4  C O N C L U S I O N :  R E - S E A R C H  O R  R E -
T H I N K ? N O ,  R E T H I N K  T H E N  R E S E A R C H  
This paper took the old saying: “Theory is one thing, practice is something 
else”, as a point of departure. Through two lines of arguments, one based on 
theories of chaos and complexity and the other based on the crisis of 
representation, it was discussed why this saying sounds reasonable. And instead 
of trying to fix the relationship, it was proposed to re-conceptualise the relation 
between theory and practice. Instead of two parallel worlds, it was suggested to 
conceptualise theory as what a given centre believes to be true and possible in 
the periphery. 
As indicated in section 2, modernist and postmodernist assumptions 
suggest different answers to the question “what does it mean to theorise?” 
To modernists, theorising means polishing the mirrors (Gergen & 
Thatchenkery, 1996). Theorising is about making ever more detailed and 
complete pictures of every aspect of a pre-given reality out-there. Theorising is 
re-search: Searching again but better, through more fine-grained devises. 
Searching for more pieces, through looking towards other places.  
For postmodernists, theorising is – according to Gergen – more about 
dreaming new realities with pragmatic consequences. Theorising is re-think: 
Thinking again in order to imagine new possibilities and thereby new avenues 
for action. An example of this position is Gergen & Gergen, who suggest 
omitting experimentation and instead engage in what they call hypothetical data 
rotation: 
The theory is expanded and its hidden features explained only when a deviant pattern of results is 
confronted. However, the effect of a deviant pattern may be achieved conceptually by rotating 
hypothetical patterns of results through the research design, and at each iteration inquiring into the 
theoretical implications of the configuration. With each pattern the investigators are forced into 
reflective elaborations (theoretical explanation) that reveals the unspoken of the theoretical 
position. (Gergen & Gergen, 1991, p. 82) 
To modernists, re-think is not relevant theorising, as the facts are waiting 
out-there to be discovered. To postmodernists, re-search is irrelevant, as it is 
impossible to gather objective facts that are not already laden with theory. 
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From a centre-periphery perspective theorising can mean both re-search 
and re-think. In section 3.2 page 18, it was argued that within this perspective 
theory is not something ostensive different from practice. Theory is what a 
centre believes to be true about or possible to accomplish in a periphery distant 
in time and place. These beliefs are partly formed by the centre’s ability to 
imagine possibilities. This ability to see possibilities can be inspired through 
different perspectives. This ability to see possible new worlds can be enhanced 
through re-thinking.  
The reason for the need for re-thinking is found in the lessons learned from 
postmodern thinking. Possibilities and opportunities are not inherent as essences 
in situations/nature/things/peripheries, etc, and therefore they cannot be found or 
dis-covered through searching. There are not a limited (but extremely high) 
number of possibilities. The number of possibilities is endless and only limited 
by imagination. 
But when some issues are re-thought, it may be relevant to re-search in 
order to try to estimate the pragmatic consequences of these new ideas. And as 
no-things (see discussion of nothing vs. no-thing page 17) resist or object there 
will be consequences. Through re-thinking new quasi-objects are constructed in 
relation to the centre doing the thinking. Through re-search these new quasi-
objects become more familiar. Their objections and resistance can be learned. 
But if modernists can start searching for bits and pieces of reality, a centre-
periphery perspective suggests that bits and pieces first have to be constructed 
through re-thinking before they can be found! 
In this way the philosophical stance can be summarised to the statement: 
The possibilities are not limited and inherent in situations, hence, they cannot be 
dis-covered. But anything does not go, as heterogeneous materials may resist 
certain definitions. 
A last issue to be discussed here is what characterise good re-thinking, if it 
has to be of more general relevance? 
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4.1 MULTIPLE APPLICABILITY AS CRITERIA OF GOOD RE-THINK 
Throughout this paper I may have, more or less arbitrarily, switched 
between dualisms like society-nature, organisation-environments, culture-
technology, subject-object or theory-practice. If I haven’t been too arbitrary I 
maybe should have been in order to make the point of this section: These 
dualities do not belong to different ontological levels going from micro, meso to 
macro level, like it is commonly imagined within organisational theory (e.g. 
Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Scott, 1998).  
Callon & Latour (1981) dissolve the distinction between micro and macro 
actors as something with different essences inherent in nature. Instead they 
suggest that micro and macro actors are heterogeneous networks, and therefore 
should be approached in the same terms, making no priory distinctions. Based 
on this idea that the different levels actually are heterogeneous networks, an 
avenue is opened for re-thinking, that are not tied to a certain level of analysis. It 
opens for an avenue of re-thinking, that have multiple applicability as a criteria 
of quality. This criterion asks for relevance outside the actual setting of the 
study. 
The idea of a distinction between theory and practice as related to a centre 
and its periphery is illustrated by using examples from theorising and 
entrepreneuring. But the same idea could be applied to what from a traditional 
perspective had been different levels. In the classic natural science sense, society 
is the centre and nature is the periphery (and there is the foundation for the 
parallel-world perspective). In organisation theory the organisation is sometimes 
considered as the centre while the environment is the periphery. In an inter-
organisational arrangement, the persons involved directly can be considered as 
the centre and their respective organisations as periphery, etc… The point is that 
the same line of thinking can be applied shed alternative light into a range of 
different situations, no matter if these situations, from a traditional hierarchical 
perspective, are determined to belong to different levels. 
In this way this papers idea of centre-periphery as an alternative to a 
parallel-world perspective illustrates the idea of multiple applicability. Another 
example from this paper is the BCG-matrix discussed in section 2.2.2. This 
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matrix can – due to its linguistic ambiguity (Astley & Zammuto, 1992) – be 
applied in a variety of different situations: An international cooperation 
discussing its portfolio of business units. An SME discussing its range of 
products or portfolio of customers. And even an individual evaluating his range 
of competences in relation to future short and long-term job opportunities. Etc… 
4.2 EPILOGUE 
And so what…? First, this line of thinking opens new avenuesper of action 
(i.e. theorising) within academia, with a focus on using perspectives or 
“knowledge” from the field social studies of science (e.g. actor-network theory) 
directly to understand entrepreneurship, and organisation and management in 
general. Why? Because, practitioners like theorists are engaged in construction 
of realities. Furthermore: Maybe theorists can get direct inspiration from the acts 
of entrepreneurs in their acts of theorising?  
In the introduction, I mentioned that I am currently working within a 
project joining researchers, consultants, and SMEs. Within a “parallel world 
perspective” – no matter if it is modernist or postmodernist in its foundations - 
consultants can be viewed as having the role of the bridge between theorists and 
practitioners. Within a modernist perspective, the role is to ground their advises 
firmly in scientific truths, while it in a postmodernist perspective is to translate 
abstract concepts into alternative avenues for actions in local contexts. 
In the perspective suggested in this paper, by contrast, researchers, 
consultants, and practitioners are centres in their own worlds and they live 
according to theories about their respective peripheries. In this way it opens for 
new ways to learn from and interact with each other. This is extra emphasised 
by the notion of paradigmatic symmetry. Paradigms ought to by formulated in 
ways that simultaneously inform theorists, consultants, managers and other 
practitioners. 
Second, this perspective may shed an interesting light into management 
within the knowledge economy and entrepreneurial management. Within the 
perspective proposed here, knowledge is not about mirroring reality, but about – 
through heterogeneous engineering – to succeed in creating reality. Success is 
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not given to the ones who know, but won by the ones who succeed in creating 
new realities to others. This suggests that practitioners may be inspired from 
successful theorists, as they are described within e.g. the sociology of translation 
or actor-network theory. Callon (1986a; 1986b) Cooper (1992) or Law (1986) 
might be interesting in this case.  
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